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1. Introduction 
Whilst a spell of unemployment will generate a direct loss of income, studies examining 
the full cost of job loss show that a period of unemployment imposes disadvantages 
individuals above and beyond this direct cost. For example, Jacobson et al (1993) provide 
evidence of a wage loss associated with displacement from employment which 
commences up to three years prior to the date of displacement and is still evident five 
years following. Furthermore, according to Huff Stevens (1997), in the post-displacement 
period a person is made much more vulnerable to repeated incidence of unemployment. 
Stewart (2000), suggests that low pay and higher incidence of job loss are correlated to 
create a low-pay-no-pay cycle; whereby individuals located low down on the income 
distribution face a relatively high risk of becoming unemployed. This combined with the 
widening gap between pre- and post- displacement wages in the UK (Nickell et al. 2002) 
results in long lasting negative effects from a spell of unemployment. The deterioration of 
labour market prospects stemming directly from an initial spell of unemployment is 
sometimes termed a ‘scar’; and can come in the form of either higher unemployment or a 
lower subsequent wage or a combination of both. 
 
There are potential policy implications related to evidence of scarring. Whilst the lowest 
exit rates from unemployment fall upon older, less educated individuals, intervention 
may be better directed towards the youth, if the evidence suggests that unemployment 
imposes a substantial scar upon individuals, which they carry for much of their future 
labour market experience. As with the old adage, ‘prevention is better than cure’, the 
prevention of extended periods of unemployment as individuals gain their first footholds 
in the labour market may reduce these long-lasting disadvantages. However, an 
econometric problem exists whereby the fixed individual characteristics which make 
someone prone to unemployment as a youth, will also drive later unemployment and poor 
wages. Further, these characteristics may well be poorly observed in conventional 
databases or difficult to observe at all, such as motivation, self-confidence and 
expectations. Consequently, the relationship between early unemployment and later 
outcomes may not be causal but reflect heterogeneity. If this is the case, policy aimed at 
reducing the incidence or duration of unemployment will be misdirected and the vast   2 
inequalities in life chances will remain. 
 
We use the National Child Development Survey (NCDS) database to explore evidence of 
scarring in the form of persistently lower wages from a person’s youth unemployment 
experience. We look at how these scars evolve in terms of the initial impact on wages and 
subsequent recovery and the countervailing impact of repeat incidence of job loss from 
entry into the labour market up to age 42.  Hence, the relationship between youth 
unemployment and the cumulative history from age 23 to 42 is explored. The NCDS has 
an expanse of information on factors often unobservable in other data, such as the cohort 
members ability (literacy, numeracy and intelligence tests) and detailed family 
background, as well as information upon their educational, occupational and economic 
achievements during their lifetime. However there exists an evaluation problem.  Any 
relationship we observe between youth unemployment and the subsequent wage may not 
be causal. If unobservable characteristics of cohort members drive early unemployment 
experiences and the later wages, our results will be biased upwards. Therefore to ensure 
the estimated relationship is truly causal we employ the Instrumental Variables technique.  
The unemployment rate prevalent locally for individuals aged 16 is employed to 
instrument youth unemployment in the wage equation for individuals aged 33. The 
intuition is that at such a young age, the individuals have little autonomy over their area 
of residence, thus the personal characteristics of the individuals are removed from the 
equation. Further, the local rate of unemployment certainly plays a role in determining 
experiences of unemployment.  We conclude that unobserved heterogeneity does not 
create a bias.  Thus our evaluation of the scarring effect of youth unemployment does 
estimate the true relationship. 
 
The research in this paper concludes that youth unemployment does indeed impose a 
wage scar upon individuals, in the magnitude of 12% to 15% at age 42.  However, this 
penalty is lower, at 8% to 10%, if individuals avoid repeat incidence of unemployment.  
The structure of the analysis of the wage scar from youth unemployment is as follows.  
The literature surrounding this topic is evaluated in section 2. Section 3 details the data 
set employed to tackle the issue at hand. The methodology adopted is described in section   3 
4. The results are analysed in section 5 with relevant tables. Following from this, section 
6 concludes and discusses the current labour market policies and the scope for future 
policies, based upon these results. 
 
2. Existing literature 
It is obvious that a period of job loss reduces a persons current income. However the 
detriment may be much longer lasting if unemployment carries a scar.  Scarring is a 
causal link between unemployment history and a negative future experience in the labour 
market.  The literature on the effects from scarring are highlights a twofold impact; 
damaging the individual’s future employment prospects and/or lowering their subsequent 
earnings; effects which potentially may last for the individual’s entire remaining working 
lifetime. 
 
A number of economic theories can predict scarring. Following the intuition of Becker 
(1975), although general skills raise a worker’s marginal productivity in all different 
firms and sectors, firm specific skills are non-transferable and thus increase the worker’s 
marginal productivity only in the firm providing the investment. A consequence of 
unemployment is the depreciation of general skills and the loss of firm specific skills.  
The worker will therefore receive a wage lower on return to the labour market than that 
received prior to the spell of unemployment. However, re-entry into the labour market 
will initiate further accumulation of human capital and hence, as long as there are 
diminishing returns to extra tenure, the scarring effects will only be temporary. 
 
In standard unemployment Search Theory, unemployment that is a consequence of an 
inappropriate match between the employer and employee will have a positive effect on 
subsequent wages. Durations of unemployment are used for job search and thus improve 
the likelihood of a good employer-employee match in subsequent jobs. However 
Pissarides (1994) extends these models to include on-the-job search and here, with 
dispersion in firm productivity, low quality firms recruit the unemployed but lose them to 
better paying higher productivity firms. Displacement from a good job means a high 
probability of return to a lower quality one and hence a cost-of-job loss. Part of these   4 
costs will be permanent if the worker remains in the low wage sector to retain firm 
specific human capital which would be lost on a switch to a better paying firm. Theories 
of dynamic monopsony would create similar predictions (see Manning 2003 for a 
discussion). 
 
In a similar vein, if the employer ex-ante  has imperfect information on the workers 
quality, they will rationally seek more information ex-post to observe worker potential. 
This leads to an initially lower wage on entry into a job. By observing the worker over 
time to improve their knowledge of the worker’s productivity, information is revealed to 
the firm but diffuses to other firms through actions from the employer, such as promoting 
or firing the employee. Unemployment is then an example of a negative signal, which 
carries a stigma effect as employers pick up on actions of other employers and view 
unemployed job seekers as having lower average quality to employed job seekers. 
Accordingly, unemployment will scar a worker throughout their entire future labour 
market experience unless they can successfully signal their true quality. 
 
Over the past decade, empirical economic studies have sought identification of the 
scarring effect from unemployment by observing wages in the periods immediately 
preceding and following the spell for workers where the displacement can be reasonably 
thought to be exogenous to their quality.  Rhum (1991) finds significant and negative 
long-term effects on wages from periods spent in unemployment. Workers displaced at 
the time of observation were more than twice as likely to have 25% lower wages and 
experience on average 6 times more weeks out of work.  Rhum also compares a control 
group of non-displaced workers to a group of displaced workers in the three years prior to 
displacement and four years following and finds that, w hilst in the long run the 
employment disadvantage diminishes, the wage penalty was large and persistent. 
 
Jacobson et al (1993) contribute to the identification of the cost of job loss by detecting 
an earnings loss three years prior to displacement using administrative records from 
Pennsylvania.  At the date of displacement there will be a dramatic drop, followed by a 
quick recovery and 5 years after displacement, individuals had 25% lower earnings,   5 
compared to non-displaced workers.  Stevens (1997) also suggests that much of the cost 
of job loss is permanent. Thus in order to prevent underestimating the scar it is necessary 
to consider the full cost of job loss from unemployment.  Stevens identifies multiple job 
loss as a key driving force behind the permanent scarring effects of unemployment, 
stating that if individuals can avoid falling into unemployment more than once, they will 
face a good chance of recovery. 
 
The UK literature explores the effects of unemployment more generally rather than 
focusing on workers displaced in a major layoff, but show similar findings. Nickel et al. 
(2002) report for the UK that the cost of job loss rose through the 1980s as wage 
inequality grew. They also explore the impact of repeated job loss and suggest that repeat 
job loss results in smaller wage penalties approximately half of that of the first incidence. 
Arulampalam (2001) uses longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) and support the findings that the cost of job loss are long-term and that second or 
subsequent interruptions are less harmful than the first. Gregory and Jukes (2001) utilise 
the combined information from two longitudinal datasets: New Earnings Survey Panel 
Dataset (NESPD) and Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS). 
Their results suggest that the impact effect of job loss is short lived but the effect of 
duration in the unemployment spell persist and are also strong in a second spell. Borland 
et al. (2002) show that when a worker displaced from their job finds a new job during the 
notice period of redundancy, therefore experiencing no unemployment, do not suffer 
these wage falls. 
 
Looking in particular at the scar imposed upon an individual from youth unemployment, 
Gregory and Jukes explore variation across age groups and suggest that the impact effect 
is more marked with older workers but the duration effects are more substantial for the 
young. Gregg (2001) uses NCDS to analyse scarring in terms of future employment 
prospects. Specifically Gregg asks whether the cumulated unemployment experience up 
to the age of 23 drives unemployment in subsequent years.  NCDS provides a wealth of 
information on individuals and despite controlling for many observable characteristics of 
individuals, Gregg identified persistent effects from youth unemployment.  In addition,   6 
an Instrumental Variables technique identifies whether this relationship is causal or 
resulting from unobserved heterogeneity. The results, suggesting that no bias was 
detected, lead to the conclusion that unemployment does causally scar individuals in 
terms of their future employment. 
 
A general consensus between these authors is that an unemployment spell consistently 
imposes a wage scar upon individuals that persist. However, these studies rarely follow 
individuals for more than 5 years or so. Although multiple spells of unemployment harm 
individuals, results indicate that the first spell carries the most significant scar but the 
impact of longer durations apply to all spells. Stevens (1997) suggests that a substantial 
part of the reason for persistent effects is that repeat incidence inhibits wage recovery and 
Gregg (2001) suggest that a spell of unemployment causally increases the likelihood of 
repeat job loss or multiple spells. This present paper is closest in spirit to Stevens in that 
we use the NCDS to track the impact of youth unemployment on earnings up to age 42, 
thus we look for adverse effects from unemployment after 19 to 26 years and we explore 
how such penalties diminish over that period and the role for further unemployment in 
preventing recovery. 
 
3. Data set 
To show the impact that youth unemployment has upon an individual’s future experience 
in the labour market, we utilise the National Child Development Survey (NCDS), a 
longitudinal birth cohort panel dataset. The NCDS children were those born in the week 
3-9 March, 1958 living in Great Britain. Information was collected on the cohorts on 
characteristics including  gender, race, region of birth and whether the parents are 
married.  Subsequently, information has been collected on these cohorts at ages 7 (1965), 
11 (1969), 16 (1974), 23 (1981), 33 (1991) and 42 (1999/2000); creating what 
approximates to a half-life time history of the individuals. 
 
During the survey, information was gathered not only from the individuals themselves.  
The parents were interviewed on topics such as their expectations and aspirations for 
their child’s educational and employment prospects, their smoking, working and personal   7 
relationship habits and the child’s health. Levels of financial difficulty were assessed and 
anxiety traits of the children recorded, for instance whether the child experienced 
depression or wet the bed. Further, the child’s ability is observed through a substantial 
number of tests administered to the children, including drawing and copying, reading, 
comprehension, mathematics and non-verbal reasoning (akin to IQ). Finally, details of 
the cohort members as adults was collected at ages 23, 33 and 42 adding insight into the 
individual’s record of crime, their family statistics (number of children, divorce) and their 
educational and employment histories. 
 
4. Methodology 
Our interest lies in the extent to which youth unemployment scars an individual in terms 
of their subsequent wage. Youth unemployment is defined as a period of unemployment 
covering the ages 16-23, i.e. as the cohort members are first able to enter the labour 
market.  Individuals pursuing further education into their twenties will not provide a 
representative picture of youth experience in the labour market, thus the sample is limited 
to individuals with an employment history lasting more than 24 months between age 16 
and 23. We attempt to identify the non-linear relationship between youth unemployment 
and the subsequent wage, grouping the youth u nemployment experience into six 
categories: zero months, 1 – 2 months, 3 – 4 months, 5 – 6 months, 7 – 12 months and 
13+ months.  We analyse the wage scar for those with youth unemployment relative to 
the counterfactual group experiencing no youth unemployment. The dependent variable 
of the tests is the natural log of the wage reported by the cohort members: we analyse this 
at three periods in their life, age 23, 33 and 42.  The analysis of the wage scar at each 




The data from NCDS is combined with information on region of residence and ward level 
unemployment rates from Census data in 1971 and 1991, for the purpose of employing 
the Instrumental Variables technique to test for potential heterogeneity manifested in the 
                                                  
1 A summary of characteristics for individuals reporting a wage at different periods of observation is given 




We aim to examine the scar from unemployment experience before the age of 23 upon 
the subsequent wage received up to the age of 42.  Any unobserved heterogeneity 
remaining in the results which is correlated with both unemployment and wages will 
create an upward bias to the estimates of the impact of preceding unemployment.  
 
Formally, individual i's wage experience at time t (Wit) is a function of their 
unemployment experience up to the age of 23 (Uit-1), heterogeneity (Zit) and an error term 
(Eit). 
      Wit = Uit-1 + Zit + Eit          (1) 
 
Heterogeneity is a set of non-time varying observable characteristics of the individual i 
(Ai) including gender, family background and child ability and unobservable 
characteristics (Bi), which may capture expectations, aspirations or self-confidence, and 
an error term (xit). 
      Zit = Ai + Bi + xit          (2) 
 
The consequence of failure to take account of heterogeneity is the belief of a strong 
relationship between unemployment and subsequent wages when, in truth it is not the 
experience of unemployment per se that results in lower wages, but the unobserved 
heterogeneity.  This will result in either an omitted variable bias, or a violation of the 
OLS assumption that the coefficient Uit-1 is correlated with the error term
2.  Subsequently 
OLS estimation of Uit-1 will be biased.  Therefore the assessment of the wage scar created 
from youth unemployment is a two stage task: First, identify the relationship between 
months of unemployment experienced before the age of 23 and the individual’s 
subsequent wage.  Second, examine whether this relationship is causal; a prerequisite for 
scarring. 
                                                  
2 i.e. that correlation(Uit-1, E it) = 0   9 
Controlling for heterogeneity 
Utilising NCDS 
The plethora of information contained in NCDS is certainly an advantage in the task of 
isolating a causal relationship between youth unemployment and the subsequent wage.  
Firstly, it is possible to include variables into the model to account for educational 
achievement and region of residence between 16-33 (reported at 16, 22 and 33). These 
additions are a necessity in any reliable wage equation; an individual’s wage is at least in 
part driven by educational attainment and, with variations in levels of employment across 
regions and therefore variations in wages, it is vital to control for region. Although we 
can condition on gender we choose to estimate the scar separately as the experience of 
males and females within the labour market is often very different.  Tracing a cohort 
through various stages of their lives means that it is not possible to include age as an 
explanatory variable of the model. 
 
Obtaining information on the variables noted so far – months spent unemployed, 
educational attainment and region – is relatively straight forward. However, the crucial 
advantage of NCDS is the information on variables that are often unobservable, such as 
school attendance, ability and childhood deprivation. These variables, although usually 
unmeasured, certainly have the potential to influence the individual’s experience within 
the labour market later in life.  We limit the analysis to those variables thought influential 
to the economic experience of the cohort. Thus, following Gregg (2001), we define a 
group of variables specific to the individual’s family background and a group of variables 
pertinent to the individual. 
 
The family background characteristics include whether the parents stayed on at school 
past age 16 (which could proxy ambitions or expectations of the parent and child), if the 
cohort member is non-white, whether the child was exposed to financial deprivation or 
put into care of the local authority and the income received by the household at age 16.  
The individual specific variables incorporate negative anxiety traits at age 7 (for example 
depression), low school attendance (truancy), sickness, scores on various school tests, for 
example vocabulary IQ and mathematics (which proxy for ability) and whether the child   10 
ever had educational special needs. If the individual and family specific characteristics 
are creating an omitted variable bias in the relationship between youth unemployment 
and subsequent wages, the coefficient of unemployment will fall with the introduction of 
these background variables. 
 
Econometric techniques 
However detailed the set of child and family information available, one or more 
important background characteristic may have been excluded from the dataset or badly 
measured. Therefore it is necessary to further control for the unobserved heterogeneity, 
through econometric techniques.  Three main methods are generally adopted in the 
scarring or cost-of-job-loss literature. 
 
Difference-in-difference 
A target group is exposed to a policy change aimed eliminating any potential scar from 
unemployment by preventing its occurrence.  The results of the group are recorded and 
compared to a benchmark group not affected by job loss, conditional on observed 
characteristics. The pre-displacement (or unemployment spell) wage should capture any 
unobserved characteristics that influence wages so that the change in the wage compared 
across affected and unaffected groups is net of such unobserved differences. Nickell et al. 
(2002) and Gregory and Jukes (2001) opted for the difference-in-difference to separate 
heterogeneity from true scarring. However, if the reason for job loss was due to the pre-
unemployment wage being too high as a result of a poor match, then even this estimate 
will be biased. Hence the cost-of-job loss literature tends to include in the sample cases 
where the displacement can reasonably be thought to be exogenous, for instance where a 
plant has closed or had mass layoffs. Here the event is plausibly exogenous to the worker 
quality.  Unfortunately such data is not available for the UK. 
 
Assume functional form 
A number of studies estimating structural dependence in unemployment (reviewed by 
Machin and Manning, 1999) attempt to separate dependence from heterogeneity by 
making assumptions about the likely distribution of such heterogeneity. Lancaster (1990)   11 
states that this method requires certain heroic assumptions regarding the parametric 
specification of heterogeneity.  However, such assumptions about the functional form of 
the model may lead to misspecification, if they are incorrect.  Indeed, Heckman and 
Borjas (1980) argue that, although the a priori assumptions are necessary for empirical 
investigations into scarring, “In most cases, such assumptions usually cannot be justified 
by an appeal to economic theory.” 
 
Instrumental variables 
For the Instrumental Variables technique it is necessary to identify as an instrument some 
variable which drives the unemployment experience - the endogenous factor - but which 
is exogenous to the individual themselves.  If it is true that the characteristics which drive 
youth unemployment also drive low wages, rather than (or as well as) the experience of 
unemployment per se acting as the driving force, then the instrument must capture the 
effect of these characteristics.  This will ensure that any results we observe, in terms of 
the relationship between unemployment and wages, is causal.  Heckman and Borjas 
(1980) cite the Instrumental Variables method as advantageous and accordingly it is the 
technique adopted in this study.  A criticism of the instrumental variables technique is the 
difficulty in identifying a valid instrument.  However, with the nature and expanse of the 
longitudinal data available, identifying an instrument is simplified. With impetus from 
Gregg (2001), the unemployment rate prevalent locally for individuals aged 16 is 
employed to instrument youth unemployment in the wage equation for individuals aged 
33. The intuition is that at such a young age, the individuals have little autonomy over 
their area of residence, thus the personal characteristics of the individuals are removed 
from the equation. Further, the local rate of unemployment certainly plays a role in 
determining experiences of unemployment. 
 
The local rate of unemployment when the individuals are aged 33 is included as an 
endogenous variable. Individuals are sorted into areas, which crudely can be classified 
into high and low income areas according to their earnings. Furthermore, the impact of 
recessions of 1980’s and 1990’s upon regions of the UK was not evenly distributed 
geographically. Thus to remove any correlation between unemployment after youth and   12 
the instrument (as individuals may not have moved far away), local unemployment rates 
in 1991 are controlled for. Consequently, local labour market conditions when the 
individuals were aged 16 will not directly impact upon later unemployment conditional 
upon local unemployment rates in 1991, except through scarring.  A criticism of using the 
local rate of unemployment or area of residence at age 16 is that rather than removing the 
influence of heterogeneity from the equation, heterogeneity is just pushed back a 
generation, as parents have an impact upon where the child lives as they enter the labour 
market. Consequently it must be noted that there is a risk of the parents’ heterogeneity 
creating a residual bias in the results but, as there is less than complete intergenerational 
immobility in life chances, then the bias should be reduced. 
 
5. Results 
Summary of NCDS data 
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the NCDS dataset, distinguishing between males 
and females.  The cohort members have been grouped into six categories, depending 
upon the number of months spent unemployed between the age of 16-23: zero months, 1-
2 months, 3-4 months, 5-6 months, 7-12 months and 13+ months.   The vast majority of 
individuals – approximately 60% - experience no unemployment during their youth, 
whilst of the remaining 40%, 11-12% reported being unemployed for only approximately 
1½ months.  However, one fifth of the sample individuals are subjected to 5+ months of 
unemployment during their youth, with the hardest hit 8% clocking up some 26 months 
unemployment as youths on average.  There is an easily identifiable correlation between 
unemployment during youth and in the subsequent decade (column V), although between 
ages 33-42 (column VII) even the individuals with extensive youth unemployment are 
rarely unemployed. This may, in part, reflect the fact that the period of 1991 to 2000 was 
characterised by a sustained upswing. 
 
Immediately obvious from columns IV, VI and VIII is the trend for the mean wage of the 
cohort to decline as youth unemployment accrues.   Men carrying the worst history from 
their youth labour market experience will be paid £4.00 per hour less twenty years later, a 
30% penalty, compared to men with no youth unemployment.  The wage gap is large for   13 
men whether the wage is measured at age 23, 33 and 42. For women the penalty is 
approximately £2.00 per hour at age 42 and is consistently slightly lower compared to 
women with no youth unemployment than for men.   
 
Wage scar at 23 
Tables 2a and b report the log wage scar at 23 for men and women respectively.  Cohort 
members are included in the analysis only if they report a wage at 23; details of the 
restricted sample are given beneath the regression results.  Almost 1,000 men and 1,500 
women have been dropped from the sample, changing the composition so that individuals 
with no history of youth unemployment have a somewhat greater representation and 
those with 13+ months have almost half as much prevalence than in the whole sample. 
 
Looking at column I, a large raw wage gap at 23 is evident between those experiencing 
5+ months of unemployment compared to those with no or very little youth 
unemployment.   In the worst case scenario, compared to an individual with no youth 
unemployment, a history of 13+ months of unemployment between the age of 16-23 is 
associated with an average reduction in earnings of a 23 year old male by almost 30% 
and the earnings of a 23 year old female by 35%.  
 
Accounting for observable heterogeneity 
Introducing controls for background characteristics in turn will identify the contribution 
of each towards the wage gap at 23, revealing the upward bias omission these 
background characteristics creates. 
 
Education and region of residence at 23 
Educational attainment is associated with different earning capacities, regardless of an 
employment history.  Relatively poorly qualified individuals achieve lower paid jobs and 
tend to experience more unemployment.  In addition, regions with higher unemployment 
tend to have lower wages. Inclusion of controls for region and education are thus vital 
initial conditions when calculating the impact of unemployment upon wages. It should, 
however, be noted that at age 23, the returns to educational qualifications are not yet fully   14 
apparent and the regional wage gaps are not strongly related to unemployment 
differences.  Column II of Tables 2a and b shows youth unemployment on the whole to 
be less severe than the previous results suggested once education and region is taken into 
account.  Inclusion of region of residence does not change the scar a great deal.  The 
implied effect of 7-12 months unemployment on wages is reduced by just 3% for men 
and 1% for women. The damaging consequence of 13+ months unemployment during 
youth is reduced by just 5% for males and by over 10% for women once the educational 
heterogeneity of the individuals is taken into account. These relatively small adjustments 
probably reflect a muted educational premia among such a young cohort. Workers with 
higher vocational qualifications or above are earning only between 13-18% if they are 
men, although the wage premia of women at 23 is larger. 
 
Family and individual specific characteristics 
Whilst educational returns are low at age 23, it may be that other factors, correlated with 
youth unemployment, are driving the observed variation in wages. The most obvious 
candidates are ability unmeasured by qualifications and dimensions of parental 
background. The NCDS unusually allows a serious attempt to control for many of these 
characteristics.  The ability of each individual, the aspirations of parents as to the 
individual’s achievements, the parental involvement in raising the individual and the 
physical and mental health of the individual, all of which are potential driving forces of 
an individual’s earnings capacity can be controlled for.  Column III of Table 2a and b 
report that inclusion of a wealth of detail capturing the family and individual 
heterogeneity does little to alter the wage scar reported above. Youth unemployment 
experience appears to be one of biggest drivers of wage rates at age 23. 
 
The wage scar at 33 
The next stage of analysis steps ten years further into the individual’s lives, looking for 
evidence of the wage scar evident at age 33.  Tables 3a-3c detail the results which 
evaluate the wage scar at age 33 and analyse how the scar changes between the age of 23 
and 33. To analyse the scar present at age 33 it is necessary to restrict the sample of 
evaluation to those reporting a wage at 33.  The restriction excludes approximately 2,400   15 
cohort members from the full sample, however the proportion of individuals within the 
different classifications of youth unemployment is fairly similar to the original sample.  
 
By age 33, the raw log wage penalty for males at every category of youth unemployment, 
reported in column 1 has intensified relative to a full employment experience, compared 
to ten years previously.   It is broadly similar for women.  Focusing upon the worst case 
scenario, for a male reporting a history of 13+ months of youth unemployment, over the 
years 23-33 the wage penalty has increased by over 10% to 42%.   
 
Conditioning upon educational achievement and region of residence becomes much more 
important as returns to education rise with age. The results in column II shows that 
obtaining a degree will increase the wage at 33 by 60% for males and by nearly 80% for 
females.  In column II, we compare two individuals with an identical educational 
background, inhabiting the same area but with a different labour market experience 
during their youth.  At age 33 we will still observe wage rates which have diverged for 
these individuals. The wage of males tends to be lower by up to 25% at 33 and the 
women’s by 18% among those with over a year worth of youth unemployment compared 
to the individual with no youth unemployment. For men with 5 to 12 months 
unemployment wages are 11-16% lower and 6-9% for women. Column III displays 
results when controlling for family and individual specific characteristics.  Again the log 
wage penalty for experiencing some youth unemployment declines once these 
characteristics were controlled for, but only marginally. Thus two males or females 
identical in terms of their level of education, their region of residence, their parent’s 
education and their IQ, literacy and numeracy test scores etc., will on average have an 
earnings gap of 23% and 16% respectively resulting from a year of youth unemployment 
for one individual.  The conditional estimates of the wage penalty associated with youth 
unemployment are now very similar at ages 23 and 33. This suggests little or no progress 
in mitigating the impact of youth unemployment over the decade. 
 
Column IV of Tables 3a and b introduce controls for unemployment experience between 
the ages of 23 and 33. This conditions out the extent to which youth unemployment   16 
experience is correlated with unemployment experience as young adults.  It also 
incorporates the repeat incidence of job loss - found to be important in the work of Gregg 
(2001) and Stevens (1997) - into the true cost of job loss.  Hence the counterfactual now 
is the wage penalty associated with no youth unemployment given similar subsequent 
unemployment experience. The wage penalties here associated with youth unemployment 
are substantially lower for men but changes little for women as the persistence in patterns 
of unemployment are much less prolific for women. The males within our sample 
experiencing 3 to 6 months unemployment as youths but no extra unemployment after 
age 23 have wage penalties of the order of 7%. For 7+ months the penalty increases to 11 
to 13%. The penalties conditional on unemployment experience are now similar for men 
and women. There is evidence of earnings recovery among those experiencing substantial 
youth unemployment, if they avoid further exposure to unemployment. However, those 
unemployed for more than 6 months as youths and again between age 23- 33 suffer very 
large wage penalties.  This finding raises a question about when the wage difference is 
first evident.  If lower ability or motivation is observed by employers but not picked up in 
the data, then the wage at 23 may be lower for individuals who go on to experience 
extensive later unemployment.  Evidence to the contrary would suggest that lower paid 
jobs are less stable and have scarring effects of their own, as suggested by Stewart 
(2000).   
 
We separate individuals experiencing at least 6 months of youth unemployment into two 
groups: those in full employment in the decade following youth and those with some 
unemployment (at least 3 months).  There was no significant difference in the wage at 23 
for the two groups of individuals
3.  Yet a person experiencing 7+ months of 
unemployment between 23 and 33 has wages at 33 that are 16-30% lower for men and 
10-19% lower for women.  So those workers who go on to experience adult 
unemployment had an insignificantly different wage at age 23 relative to other workers 
with similar pre-23 characteristics but no later unemployment. This suggests that it is the 
unemployment experience that induces scarring, rather than ability, unobserved by the 
                                                  
3 Coefficient for men with youth unemployment and some later unemployment was 0.0426 (0.0476).  For 
women the coefficient was –0.0844 (0.0614).   17 
researcher but apparent to employers, that drives down the wage received later in life.   
 
Playing catch up 
Table 3c explores the dynamics of the wage penalty between ages 23 and 33.  This 
requires both wages at 23 and 33 to be observed. This further restricts the sample, 
especially among those with a substantial history of youth unemployment, as their wage 
is less likely to be observed at 23. The wage growth equation differs from comparing the 
wage gap level at 23 and 33 to the extent that those missing a wage at 23 can appear in 
the wage equation at 33 and vice versa. So to explore the impact of this selection we 
included a dummy variable which equals one if individuals report a wage at 23 and 0 
otherwise into the equation for wages at 33 and a similar dummy for reporting a wage at 
33 in the age 23 wage equation. This tests whether the sample population being dropped 
by moving to a wage growth equation differs from the residual populations. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly both sets of terms are positive.  Men and women with an observed wage at 
23 and at 33 have wages that are nearly 7-8% higher for given other characteristics at age 
23, hence low wage jobs are generally less stable. Women reporting a wage at age 23 will 
tend to receive a wage at 33 which is 15% higher for given characteristics.  For men the 
effect is smaller, at around 4%, however once we condition upon unemployment 
experience between ages 23 and 33 the effect disappears.   
 
The individuals not reporting a wage at either 23 or 33 are those spending relatively more 
time unemployed as youths.  The consequence in terms of selection in the wage growth 
equation is that the picture of earnings progression for the high youth unemployment 
groups will be altered by the selection criteria.  For men, the bias of focusing analysis on 
those reporting wages at both 23 and 33 results in the wage growth of those with 
substantial youth unemployment being somewhat exaggerated.  This is because the bias 
is stronger at 23 than 33.  For women, the picture is reversed. 
 
Columns I and IV of Table 3c show the correlations between wage growth and youth 
unemployment conditioning for education, region of residence and the family and 
individual characteristics of the cohort members, for men and women respectively. The   18 
results match implications of the above results that there is no significant catch-up for 
individuals with a substantial amount of youth unemployment.  Columns II and V control 
for repeat unemployment between the age of 23 and 33 and suggest that there is wage 
recovery among men experiencing over a year of youth unemployment.  Pooling those 
with 5+ months unemployment improves the precision of the estimated wage growth and 
suggests modest recovery of around 5% for those who go on to experience little or no 
further unemployment. These results again show how the common pattern of exposure to 
further substantial unemployment continues to damage individuals with substantial youth 
unemployment and on average prevents recovery among men. For women repeat 
exposure is less of an issue. 
 
Also utilising the NCDS, Gregg and Machin (2000) found that there are significant wage 
returns from late achievement of educational qualifications.  18% of males and 12% of 
females from our sample improve their educational achievement between 23-33 and 
columns III and VI of Table 3c shows that a wage improvement of 11% for men and 15% 
for women can be attributed to late educational development.  The educational upgrade 
variable was interacted with long-term youth unemployment (defined as a spell greater 
than 4 months) and included into the previous equation to isolate any difference in the 
ability to "catch up" for the more disadvantaged individuals.  The size of the effect for 
both genders is small and insignificant, indicating that regardless of an individual’s 
employment experience in their early years of labour market activity, late educational 
developers can improve their earnings potential.  Thus there is a chance of weakening the 
scar from youth unemployment through returning to education. However, such upgrading 
is neither more common among those experiencing a lot of youth unemployment – the 
target group – nor does it fully compensate for the loss of earnings resulting from the 
youth unemployment. 
 
The wage scar at 42 
More than twenty years after an event of unemployment has occurred, does the negative 
impact remain?  Tables 4a and 4b report the results for wages at age 42.  The sample is 
restricted to include those who report a wage at 42.  Compared to the scar prevailing at   19 
age 33, the raw wage penalty from youth unemployment observed when individuals are 
aged 42 has weakened slightly.  13+ months of youth unemployment is associated with a 
raw wage gap of approximately 30% at age 23 for men, which increases to 42% by age 
33 and falls back to 32% by age 42.  The overall picture seems slightly different for 
women, whereby the wage penalty at age 23 is 34%, increasing marginally to 35% at 33, 
but by age 42 falls to 25%.  Education accounts for a large amount of the wage gap at 42, 
as column II of Table 4a and b show: qualification to degree standard pushes wages up by 
around 65-70%, relative to no qualifications.  Column III adds family and individual 
specific characteristics into the equation, with the intent of isolating the detriment from 
youth unemployment upon the wage at 42, regardless of the individual themselves.  The 
fall in the log wage penalty is approximately 2% for males with an experience of youth 
unemployment over 7 months, but is very small for females. These conditional estimates 
of the wage penalty at age 42 are now much lower than at age 23 or 33. For males the 
conditional wage gap, for over a year of unemployment before the age of 23, is 23% at 
age 23 and 33 but just 15% at age 42. The pattern for shorter youth unemployment (3-12 
months) shows similar shrinkage in the wage penalty.  For women, the reduction in these 
penalties is even more marked. For both men and women, only youth unemployment 
over 6 months statistically is significantly negatively related to wages at age 42.  
 
Again, it is informative to differentiate between the persistence of the wage penalty 
derived through repeat exposure to unemployment and that which persists even with 
continuous employment. In Tables 4a and b, columns IV and V display the scar at 42 
controlling for unemployment exposure between ages 23 and 33 and then 33 to 42 
additively.  For men and women, long term youth unemployment of over 6 months 
damages the wage at 42 even if they remain out of unemployment after the age of 23. The 
magnitude of the permanent wage scar is modest at just 6-10% and the results remain 
statistically significant.  Intervening spells of unemployment are more important for men 
than women and although repeat exposure after age 33 is important for wages, 
conditioning on later unemployment exposure does not affect the magnitude of the wage 
penalty associated with youth unemployment. That is, for men, once unemployment 
experience between the ages of 23 and 33 is conditioned upon, further unemployment   20 
experience is uncorrelated with youth unemployment patterns. As shown in Table 1 there 
is a far more muted relationship between youth unemployment and that experienced after 
age 33.  Thus the persistence effect of unemployment dies out if a worker can avoid a 
further spell for 10 years or so.  However, they are still left with a wage scar. The direct 
impact of recent unemployment on earnings is strong throughout such that over a year 
worth of cumulated unemployment experiencing in the preceding 8 to 10 years 
(depending upon the period) reduces wages by around 30% for men and 15-20% for 
women.  
 
Table 4c analyses the wage growth prevalent between the age of 33 and 42.  The sample 
includes individuals reporting a wage at 33 and 42.  Again this involves a change in 
sample selection and we explore if this makes any difference by including a dummy 
variable for not reporting a wage at 33 in the age 42 equation. The samples reporting both 
wages have on average higher wages than those missing one or the other. Those reporting 
a wage at 33 have wages at 42, which are 10% higher than for those that did not after 
conditioning on other characteristics. Likewise, those reporting a wage at 42 had wages at 
33 that were 7-8% higher than those that did not. There were no differences across gender 
in these patterns. Hence the bias in growth appears small. 
 
The coefficients reported in column I and IV show the relationship between wage growth 
and youth unemployment, once education, region of residence, family and individual 
characteristics have been controlled for, for men and women. The wage recovery is now 
far less marked, with men experiencing 5+ months unemployment pre-23 showing 
recovery of around 7%. The results for women are effectively zero. Columns II and V 
further control for unemployment between 23-33 and columns III and VI control for 
unemployment in the following decade.  Evident from the table is that there is little 
relative wage growth in the past two decades.  Here it makes little difference whether 
later unemployment is conditioned on.  To summarise, the recovery of wages among 
those experiencing 5+ months youth unemployment mainly occurs by age 33 unless it is 
interrupted for some by repeat bursts of unemployment. Even so the recovery is partial  
some twenty years later, suggesting a near permanent wage scar.   21 
 
Further accounting for unobservable heterogeneity 
Unobserved individual characteristics 
In the results presented above the wage penalty associated with youth unemployment is 
sharply reduced once education and region are conditioned on. However, further 
conditioning on a wealth of individual ability and family background measures makes 
only a modest further reduction in the relationship between youth unemployment and 
wages. On one hand, this result might signify that we are capturing the major cross-
correlates between youth unemployment and wages leaving no residual bias from 
unobserved heterogeneity and thus isolating the pure scarring effect.  However, there may 
be other variables which determine the hourly wage which are correlated with youth 
unemployment and thus continue to cloud the observed scarring effect.  The results 
presented above show that wages at 23 do not differ significantly between those who go 
on to experience more than 3 months further unemployment after age 23 and those who 
have little or no further unemployment, after conditioning on observed characteristics. 
Hence employers of cohort members at age 23 are not observing and rewarding some 
ability component unobserved to the researcher, which is correlated with the revealed 
future unemployment experience. This suggests that the large conditional wage penalties 
at age 33, or indeed 42, associated with unemployment in the preceding decade were 
unobservable to employers at 23 (or 33 for wages at 42). However, there may still be 
concerns that youth unemployment experience reflects some unobserved ability factor 
and that the persistent wage penalty reflects this unobserved ability rather than 
unemployment per se.   
 
Therefore we extended the current analysis by adopting an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach to analyse the impact of youth unemployment upon the wage at 33. The 
instrument is the local area (ward level) unemployment rate prevalent as the cohort 
members can first enter the labour market at age 16.  The intuition for the decision is that 
at 16, the individual cohort members are unlikely to have chosen the area within which 
they live.  However the local unemployment rate certainly drives the labour market 
experience of the individual; thus an exogenous source of variation in youth   22 
unemployment experience can be captured by the instrument, allowing accurate 
calculation of the true scarring effect.  A strong instrument must drive wages whilst 
remaining exogenous to the individual themselves.  A likelihood ratio tests confirms the 
strength of the instrument in driving youth unemployment: statistically the instrument is a 
strong predictor of the endogenous variable. 
 
To avoid the requirement of non-linear instruments, a linear model is adopted, where the 
effect of one month of youth unemployment upon the natural log of the hourly wage 
reported at age 33 is evaluated.  In addition, there maybe a concern that some people will 
not have left their home area by age 33 or have moved nearby. So we also condition on 
ward level unemployment at age 33, to make sure our instrument is not capturing 
persistence in residence. This disaggregated data on unemployment is not available at age 
42 and hence we only focus on cohort members at age 33 for the IV estimation. Table 5 
reports the results from an estimation controlling for education, region of residence, 
family and individual effects.  One month of unemployment will reduce a male 
individual’s wage at 33 by 0.8% and will reduce a female individual’s wage at 33 by 
0.7%, conditional on education level, measures of family background and ability and 
ward level unemployment at age 33 from the 1991 Census.  The application of the IV 
technique does change the coefficients; the estimated impact of months of youth 
unemployment upon the subsequent wage rises slightly, although the results are not 
largely different from the OLS estimates.  If heterogeneity was creating a bias in the 
results and pushing up the perceived scarring effect from youth unemployment, the IV 
technique should cause the impact of unemployment upon wages to fall.  Even if the 
instrument is capturing unobserved parental characteristics that have sorted families into 
more deprived areas, as we condition on a lot of family and parental factors, then the bias 
should still be reduced through the IV approach and the coefficient fall. Intergenerational 
transmission produces far less than a complete replication across generations (see 
Dearden et al. 1997).   
 
One simple interpretation for the change could be that the inclusion of an instrument 
creates ‘wobble’ in the coefficient on youth unemployment, which is never significantly   23 
different from the un-instrumented coefficient. In other words, there is no economic 
explanation for the observed movement of the coefficient.  Alternatively an error could 
lie in the assumption necessary for ease of calculation, of a linear relationship between 
the hourly wage and months of youth unemployment. Although we explored this by 
capping the months of unemployment at different levels between 25 and 50, the pattern 
of results was unaffected. A third plausible explanation is that the instrument reflects 
neighbourhood effects which influence youth’s unobserved characteristics and impact 
upon both earnings and employment opportunities for youths.  We cannot test for this 
here, but given the assumption that the local employment conditions when youths first 
enter the labour market affect youth’s early unemployment experiences in a way that is 
exogenous to the unobserved characteristics of the individual, then the importance of the 
results is that the instrumentation does not reduce the magnitude of the results – 
suggesting that the wage penalty identified is accurate.  Therefore we can conclude that 
there are no substantive biases to our estimates of the scarring effects of youth 
unemployment from unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
6. Conclusion 
There is a plethora of empirical evidence to suggest that a spell of unemployment harms 
an individual’s labour market outcomes, both in terms of future employment prospects 
and in terms of wages.  We contribute to these studies by examining the consequence of 
youth unemployment upon the cumulative wage experience up to twenty years later.  We 
look at the mechanisms by which youth unemployment translates into labour market 
outcomes, in order to identify true potential for policy intervention.  Our findings are that 
youth unemployment imposes a sizeable wage scar upon both males and females at age 
23 followed by substantial recovery over the next ten years, but only if the individual can 
avoid further spells of unemployment after age 23.  A modest residual wage scar of 
around 8% persists up to twenty years later even for those who have no further 
unemployment experience. Those with extensive youth unemployment are at higher risk 
of further unemployment through to age 33 and this inhibits wage recovery. However 
there was no further relationship between youth unemployment and unemployment 
reported after age 33.  The results suggest therefore that wages recovery slowly and   24 
incompletely after a substantive bout of youth unemployment. Further, subsequent 
exposure to unemployment retards this recovery process. So interventions to reduce the 
exposure of young adults to substantive periods of unemployment could if successful 
have substantial returns in terms of the individual’s lifetime earnings and could represent 
a good investment.   25 
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Table 1 
Summary of NCDS Sample 
 
 













Mean Pay at 23 















£ per hour 
(2000 prices) 
Men               
0 months  2607  58.6  0  6.400  1.450  10.500  1.160  12.386 
1-2 months  539  12.1  1.430  6.190  3.023  9.823  1.581  12.195 
3-4 months  364  8.2  3.374  5.938  2.984  9.649  3.280  11.728 
5-6 months  231  5.2  5.472  5.660  4.627  9.045  1.814  11.778 
7-12 months  342  7.7  9.190  5.553  7.285  8.090  4.368  9.989 
13+ months  366  8.2  25.680  4.726  21.745  7.132  10.150  8.461 
Total  4449  100             
                 
Women                 
0 months  2769  61.1  0  5.680  1.315  6.841  0.786  8.021 
1-2 months  516  11.4  1.483  5.555  2.548  6.844  0.831  7.633 
3-4 months  384  8.5  3.401  5.134  1.829  6.658  0.766  7.810 
5-6 months  215  4.7  5.484  5.000  3.352  6.469  0.898  8.756 
7-12 months  335  7.4  9.167  4.795  2.896  6.299  2.284  7.508 
13+ months  314  6.9  23.815  4.100  8.207  4.911  2.025  5.807 
Total  4533  100             
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Table 2a 
Dependent Variable is Log Wage Penalty aged 23 for Males 
  I  II  III 
Youth Unemployment  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months  -0.033  -0.021  -0.016 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
3-4 Months  -0.055  -0.041  -0.042 
  (0.025)**  (0.024)*  (0.025)* 
5-6 Months  -0.126  -0.112  -0.105 
  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)** 
7-12 Months  -0.131  -0.100  -0.100 
  (0.029)**  (0.028)**  (0.029)** 
13+ Months  -0.296  -0.242  -0.232 
    (0.034)**  (0.034)**  (0.034)** 
Education Variables       
Lower vocational    0.100  0.107 
Qualifications    (0.063)  (0.063)* 
Lower academic    0.035  0.023 
    (0.049)  (0.049) 
Intermediate Vocational    0.095  0.080 
    (0.045)**  (0.045)* 
O’Level or equivalent    0.104  0.091 
    (0.019)**  (0.021)** 
Higher Vocational    0.153  0.139 
    (0.021)**  (0.023)** 
A’Level or equivalent    0.174  0.154 
    (0.031)**  (0.034)** 
Level 5 vocational    0.178  0.161 
    (0.026)**  (0.028)** 
Degree or equivalent    0.126  0.105 
    (0.025)**  (0.030)** 
Controls       
Regional Variables aged 23
4  No  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual Variables  No  No  Yes 
 
NCDS Sample: Conditional upon reporting wage at 23 
Youth Unemployment  No. Individs 
% of 
Sample 
Mean Pay at 23 
£ per hour (2000 prices) 
Average Months Youth 
Unemployment 
Males         
0 Months  2263    6.400  0 
1-2 Months  449    6.190  1.425 
3-4 Months  286    5.940  3.392 
5-6 Months  169    5.660  5.420 
7-12 Months  207    5.553  9.048 
13+ Months  146    4.726  23.274 
Total  3520       
                                                  
4 Full regression results are available from the authors.   30 
Table 2b 
Dependent Variable is Log Wage Penalty aged 23 for Females 
       
  I  II  III 
Youth Unemployment  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months  -0.029  -0.039  -0.036 
  (0.024)  (0.023)*  (0.023) 
3-4 Months  -0.103  -0.119  -0.116 
  (0.029)**  (0.027)**  (0.027)** 
5-6 Months  -0.133  -0.129  -0.127 
  (0.038)**  (0.036)**  (0.036)** 
7-12 Months  -0.154  -0.146  -0.125 
  (0.033)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)** 
13+ Months  -0.335  -0.221  -0.192 
  (0.042)**  (0.040)**  (0.040)** 
Education Variables       
Lower vocational    0.028  -0.012 
Qualifications    (0.052)  (0.052) 
Lowe r academic    0.024  -0.020 
    (0.068)  (0.067) 
Intermediate Vocational    -0.018  -0.024 
    (0.088)  (0.087) 
O’Level or equivalent    0.141  0.063 
    (0.021)**  (0.022)** 
Higher Vocational    0.231  0.136 
    (0.031)**  (0.033)** 
A’Level or equivalent    0.310  0.199 
    (0.034)**  (0.037)** 
Level 5 vocational    0.351  0.261 
    (0.027)**  (0.029)** 
Degree or equivalent    0.425  0.308 
    (0.027)**  (0.032)** 
Controls       
Regional Variables aged 23  No  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual Variables  No  No  Yes 
 
NCDS Sample: Conditional upon reporting wage at 23 
Youth Unemployment No. Individs 
Mean Pay at 23 
£ per hour (2000 prices) 
Average Months Youth 
Unemployment 
Females       
0 Months  1942  5.680  0 
1-2 Months  351  5.555  1.479 
3-4 Months  242  5.134  3.397 
5-6 Months  127  5.000  5.496 
7-12 Months  174  4.795  9.109 
13+ Months  103  4.000  20.990 
Total  2939     
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Table 3a 
Dependent Variable is Log Wage Penalty aged 33 for Males 
  I  II  III  IV 
Youth Unemployment  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months  -0.075  -0.030  -0.026  -0.014 
  (0.024)**  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
3-4 Months  -0.098  -0.089  -0.090  -0.070 
  (0.029)**  (0.025)**  (0.025)**  (0.025)** 
5-6 Months  -0.136  -0.113  -0.106  -0.073 
  (0.035)**  (0.031)**  (0.030)**  (0.030)** 
7-12 Months  -0.252  -0.160  -0.154  -0.106 
  (0.030)**  (0.027)**  (0.026)**  (0.026)** 
13+ Months  -0.424  -0.252  -0.231  -0.133 
  (0.030)**  (0.027)**  (0.027)**  (0.028)** 
Education Variables 
Lower vocational    0.231  0.207  0.193 
qualifications    (0.060)**  (0.059)**  (0.058)** 
Lower academic    0.117  0.084  0.082 
    (0.051)**  (0.051)*  (0.050)* 
Intermediate Vocational    0.160  0.115  0.110 
    (0.051)**  (0.051)**  (0.050)** 
O’Level or equivalent    0.227  0.156  0.151 
    (0.020)**  (0.021)**  (0.021)** 
Higher Vocational    0.277  0.199  0.190 
    (0.023)**  (0.024)**  (0.023)** 
A’Level or equivalent    0.489  0.357  0.350 
    (0.031)**  (0.034)**  (0.033)** 
Level 5 vocational    0.448  0.347  0.333 
    (0.027)**  (0.029)**  (0.028)** 
Degree or equivalent    0.603  0.457  0.450 
    (0.025)**  (0.030)**  (0.029)** 
Unemployment 23-33         
1-2 Months        -0.031 
        (0.036) 
3-4 Months        -0.185 
        (0.041)** 
5-6 Months        -0.192 
        (0.048)** 
7-12 Months        -0.158 
        (0.036)** 
13+ Months        -0.297 
        (0.027)** 
Controls         
Regional Variables aged 23  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual Variables  No  No  Yes  Yes 
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NCDS Sample of Males: Conditional upon reporting wage at 33 




Mean Pay at 
33 





Males         
0 Months  1924  0  10.500  1.413 
1-2 Months  400  1.430  9.823  2.865 
3-4 Months  267  3.371  9.649  3.187 
5-6 Months  172  5.459  9.045  4.430 
7-12 Months  240  9.217  8.100  7.225 
13+ Months  245  25.233  7.132  18.775 
Total  3248         33 
Table 3b 
Dependent Variable is Log Wage Penalty aged 33 for Females 
         
  I  II  III  IV 
Youth Unemployment  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months  -0.025  -0.034  -0.031  -0.023 
  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
3-4 Months  -0.049  -0.085  -0.083  -0.081 
  (0.033)  (0.029)**  (0.028)**  (0.028)** 
5-6 Months  -0.099  -0.059  -0.060  -0.050 
  (0.044)**  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
7-12 Months  -0.121  -0.086  -0.077  -0.067 
  (0.036)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)** 
13+ Months  -0.350  -0.185  -0.166  -0.141 
  (0.038)**  (0.033)**  (0.033)**  (0.033)** 
Education Variables       
Lower vocational    0.203  0.160  0.162 
qualifications    (0.056)**  (0.056)**  (0.056)** 
Lower academic    0.223  0.176  0.180 
    (0.075)**  (0.075)*  (0.074)* 
Intermediate Vocational    -0.146  -0.128  -0.144 
    (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
O’Level or equivalent    0.199  0.131  0.129 
    (0.020)**  (0.022)**  (0.022)** 
Higher Vocational    0.394  0.311  0.302 
    (0.035)**  (0.037)**  (0.037)** 
A’Level or equivalent    0.573  0.451  0.443 
    (0.038)**  (0.041)**  (0.041)** 
Level 5 vocational    0.626  0.544  0.538 
    (0.029)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)** 
Degree or equivalent    0.785  0.657  0.648 
    (0.029)**  (0.034)**  (0.034)** 
Unemployment 23-33         
1-2 Months        0.037 
        (0.052) 
3-4 Months        -0.073 
        (0.058) 
5-6 Months        0.002 
        (0.067) 
7-12 Months        -0.098 
        (0.045)* 
13+ Months        -0.186 
        (0.038)** 
Controls         
Regional Variables aged 23  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual Variables  No  No  Yes  Yes 
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NCDS Sample of Females: Conditional upon reporting wage at 33 




Mean Pay at 
33 




Females         
0 Months  2016  0  7.186  1.112 
1-2 Months  394  1.464  6.844  2.595 
3-4 Months  282  3.401  6.658  1.487 
5-6 Months  152  5.493  6.469  4.041 
7-12 Months  233  9.227  6.299  2.516 
13+ Months  209  22.321  4.911  7.047 
Total  3286       
 
Table 3c 
Dependent Variable is Wage Growth between ages 23-33 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
  Wage Growth 
  Males  Females 
Youth Unemployment             
1-2 Months  0.023  0.035  0.041  -0.038  -0.032  -0.033 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
3-4 Months  -0.015  -0.001  -0.003  -0.010  -0.009  -0.019 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
5-6 Months  0.044  0.061  0.063  0.088  0.090  0.083 
  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.053)*  (0.053)*  (0.053) 
7-12 Months  -0.042  -0.025  -0.029  0.053  0.065  0.063 
  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
13+ Months  0.048  0.082  0.081  0.035  0.056  0.053 
  (0.045)  (0.045)*  (0.044)*  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.059) 
Unemployment 23-33             
1-2 Months    0.050  0.046    0.114  0.113 
    (0.049)  (0.049)    (0.075)  (0.074) 
3-4 Months    -0.174  -0.182    -0.092  -0.093 
    (0.059)**  (0.059)**    (0.074)  (0.073) 
5-6 Months    0.027  0.024    -0.124  -0.128 
    (0.067)  (0.067)    (0.093)  (0.093) 
7-12 Months    -0.173  -0.167    -0.032  -0.022 
    (0.051)**  (0.051)**    (0.061)  (0.061) 
13+ Months    -0.260  -0.260    -0.178  -0.185 
    (0.042)**  (0.042)**    (0.058)**  (0.058)** 
Educational Upgrade      0.108      0.153 
      (0.023)**      (0.033)** 
Controls             
Education Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional Variables aged 23  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual 
Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 4a 
Dependent Variable is Log Wage at age 42 for Males 
 
           
  I  II  III  IV  V 
Youth Unemployment  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months  -0.076  -0.041  -0.039  -0.031  -0.029 
  (0.031)**  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
3-4 Months  -0.046  -0.055  -0.051  -0.037  -0.026 
  (0.037)  (0.034)*  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.033) 
5-6 Months  -0.038  -0.020  -0.006  0.016  0.020 
  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
7-12 Months  -0.184  -0.125  -0.118  -0.078  -0.070 
  (0.038)**  (0.035)**  (0.035)**  (0.035)**  (0.035)** 
13+ Months  -0.315  -0.182  -0.154  -0.094  -0.078 
  (0.041)**  (0.038)**  (0.038)**  (0.039)**  (0.039)** 
Education Variables       
Lower vocational    0.171  0.151  0.157  0.143 
qualifications    (0.084)**  (0.084)*  (0.083)*  (0.083)* 
Lower academic    0.124  0.097  0.099  0.087 
    (0.070)*  (0.070)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
Intermediate Vocational    0.071  0.040  0.048  0.028 
    (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.064) 
O’Level or equivalent    0.230  0.163  0.164  0.156 
    (0.027)**  (0.029)**  (0.028)**  (0.028)** 
Higher Vocational    0.280  0.207  0.207  0.198 
    (0.030)**  (0.032)**  (0.032)**  (0.032)** 
A’Level or equivalent    0.572  0.453  0.451  0.436 
    (0.041)**  (0.045)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)** 
Level 5 vocational    0.404  0.308  0.300  0.287 
    (0.036)**  (0.038)**  (0.038)**  (0.038)** 
Degree or equivalent    0.644  0.504  0.505  0.486 
    (0.033)**  (0.039)**  (0.039)**  (0.039)**   36 
Table 4a continued 
 
Unemployment 23-33  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months        0.002  0.028 
        (0.048)  (0.049) 
3-4 Months        -0.155  -0.136 
        (0.056)**  (0.056)** 
5-6 Months        -0.148  -0.108 
        (0.063)**  (0.064)* 
7-12 Months        -0.154  -0.133 
        (0.051)**  (0.051)** 
13+ Months        -0.195  -0.145 
        (0.039)**  (0.040)** 
Unemployment 33-42         
1-2 Months          -0.052 
          (0.067) 
3-4 Months          -0.141 
          (0.060)** 
5-6 Months          -0.051 
          (0.066) 
7-12 Months          -0.218 
          (0.060)** 
13+ Months          -0.270 
          (0.053)** 
Controls           
Regional Variables aged 23  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual Variables  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 














Mean Pay at 
42 
£ per hour 
Males           
0 Months  1722  0  1.221  0.963  12.386 
1-2 Months  340  1.424  2.379  1.182  12.195 
3-4 Months  226  3.385  2.802  2.960  11.728 
5-6 Months  137  5.460  2.925  1.036  11.778 
7-12 Months  215  9.107  7.427  3.214  9.990 
13+ Months  182  22.429  16.277  6.148  8.461 
Total  2822         
   37 
Table 4b 
Dependent Variable is Log Wage at aged 42 for Females 
 
           
  I  II  III  IV  V 
Youth Unemployment  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months  -0.039  -0.044  -0.040  -0.038  -0.038 
  (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
3-4 Months  -0.004  -0.032  -0.027  -0.027  -0.025 
  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
5-6 Months  -0.026  -0.018  -0.018  -0.013  -0.011 
  (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
7-12 Months  -0.068  -0.058  -0.063  -0.062  -0.059 
  (0.037)*  (0.033)*  (0.033)*  (0.033)*  (0.033)* 
13+ Months  -0.252  -0.114  -0.116  -0.107  -0.101 
  (0.042)**  (0.038)**  (0.038)**  (0.039)**  (0.039)** 
Education Variables       
Lower vocational    0.077  0.044  0.046  0.039 
qualifications    (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
Lower academic    -0.002  -0.048  -0.047  -0.050 
    (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.087) 
Intermediate Vocational    0.016  0.016  0.015  0.014 
    (0.107)  (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.106) 
O’Level or equivalent    0.177  0.134  0.133  0.133 
    (0.022)**  (0.024)**  (0.024)**  (0.024)** 
Higher Vocational    0.321  0.267  0.263  0.261 
    (0.038)**  (0.040)**  (0.040)**  (0.040)** 
A’Level or equivalent    0.494  0.418  0.414  0.415 
    (0.040)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)**  (0.043)** 
Level 5 vocational    0.571  0.519  0.516  0.515 
    (0.031)**  (0.033)**  (0.033)**  (0.033)** 
Degree or equivalent    0.729  0.643  0.639  0.638 
    (0.032)**  (0.037)**  (0.037)**  (0.037)**   38 
Table 4b continued 
 
Unemployment 23-33  Log Wage Penalty 
1-2 Months        0.038  0.032 
        (0.059)  (0.059) 
3-4 Months        -0.006  -0.005 
        (0.065)  (0.066) 
5-6 Months        -0.062  -0.045 
        (0.077)  (0.077) 
7-12 Months        -0.048  -0.048 
        (0.050)  (0.051) 
13+ Months        -0.080  -0.075 
        (0.044)*  (0.045)* 
Unemployment 33-42         
1-2 Months          -0.091 
          (0.083) 
3-4 Months          0.185 
          (0.076)** 
5-6 Months          -0.007 
          (0.073) 
7-12 Months          -0.133 
          (0.080)* 
13+ Months          -0.131 
          (0.071)* 
Controls           
Regional Variables aged 23  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual Variables  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 














Mean Pay at 
42 
£ per hour 
Females           
0 Months  1861  0  1.252  0.694  8.021 
1-2 Months  333  1.486  2.630  0.700  7.633 
3-4 Months  249  3.390  1.219  0.936  7.810 
5-6 Months  139  5.489  2.867  0.655  8.756 
7-12 Months  214  9.061  1.673  1.706  7.508 
13+ Months  161  22.100  6.264  1.292  5.807 
Total  2957         
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Table 4c Wage Growth between ages 33-42 
 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
  Wage Growth 
  Males  Females 
Youth Unemployment 
1-2 Months  -0.011  -0.011  -0.012  0.004  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
3-4 Months  0.007  0.003  0.007  0.030  0.029  0.028 
  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
5-6 Months  0.073  0.069  0.075  -0.038  -0.040  -0.036 
  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
7-12 Months  0.055  0.045  0.047  0.014  0.010  0.009 
  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
13+ Months  0.011  -0.006  -0.005  -0.001  -0.011  -0.010 
  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Unemployment 23-33 
1-2 Months    0.058  0.062    0.088  0.093 
    (0.048)  (0.049)    (0.066)  (0.067) 
3-4 Months    -0.024  -0.016    0.016  0.025 
    (0.055)  (0.055)    (0.075)  (0.075) 
5-6 Months    0.065  0.082    -0.078  -0.058 
    (0.065)  (0.065)    (0.094)  (0.095) 
7-12 Months    0.009  0.007    0.037  0.042 
    (0.053)  (0.053)    (0.059)  (0.060) 
13+ Months    0.065  0.087    0.069  0.087 
    (0.039)  (0.040)*    (0.051)  (0.053) 
Unemployment 33-42 
1-2 Months      0.087      -0.052 
      (0.069)      (0.099) 
3-4 Months      -0.060      0.068 
      (0.060)      (0.089) 
5-6 Months      -0.040      -0.120 
      (0.067)      (0.086) 
7-12 Months      -0.042      -0.151 
      (0.062)      (0.088) 
13+ Months      -0.212      -0.031 
      (0.059)**      (0.085) 
Controls             
Education Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional Variables aged 23  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Family & Individual 
Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Mean Pay at 
33 




Mean Pay at 
42 
£ per hour 
Males           
0 Months  1496  0  8.327  1.148  12.562 
1-2 Months  287  1.422  7.945  2.016  11.760 
3-4 Months  184  3.380  7.736  2.627  11.558 
5-6 Months  118  5.441  7.328  3.018  12.347 
7-12 Months  165  9.285  6.492  7.387  10.282 
13+ Months  143  22.133  3.013  12.738  8.597 
Total  2393   
     
Females           
0 Months  1471  0  5.657  1.128  8.218 
1-2 Months  271  1.480  5.269  2.471  7.817 
3-4 Months  200  3.395  5.462  1.121  8.150 
5-6 Months  107  5.477  5.353  3.163  8.421 
7-12 Months  154  9.104  5.309  1.643  7.968 
13+ Months  116  21.888  4.000  6.197  5.861 
Total  2319   
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Table 5 
Dependent Variable is Wage at age 33 
 
  I  II  III  IV 
  Males  Females 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Months of Youth Unemployment  -0.008  -0.019  -0.007  -0.023 
  (0.001)**  (0.011)*  (0.001)**  (0.031) 
Ward Level Unemployment 33  -0.015  -0.010  -0.003  0.001 
  (0.002)**  (0.004)***  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Controls         
Education Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Appendix A.1.  Characteristics for individuals reporting wage at different periods of observation 
 
Men 






      yes  no  yes  no  yes  no     
Youth Unemployment  Mean  3.552  2.215  8.62  3.327  4.163  2.848  4.774  1.928  8.437 
  Observations  4449  3520  929  3248  1201  2822  1627  2020  263 
Unemployment 23-33 Mean  4.049  2.149  11.249  3.637  5.166  3.014  5.845  1.609  10.443 
  Observations  4449  3520  929  3248  1201  2822  1627  2020  263 
Unemployment 33-42 Mean  2.404  1.802  4.687  2.086  3.266  1.649  3.676  1.171  5.532 
  Observations  4449  3520  929  3248  1201  2822  1627  2020  263 
Wage 23  Mean  2.715  2.715  x  2.755  2.586  2.78  2.584  2.802  x 
  Observations  3520  3520    2687  833  2344  1176  2020  x 
Wage 33  Mean  7.714  7.83  7.159  7.714  x  7.921  7.137  7.997  x 
  Observations  3248  2687  561  3248  x  2393  855  2020  x 
Wage 42  Mean  11.845  11.901  11.568  11.983  11.071  11.845  x  12.061  x 
  Observations  2822  2344  478  2393  429  2822  x  2020  x 
 
Women 






      yes  no  yes  no  yes  no     
Youth Unemployment  Mean  3.044  1.969  5.027  2.795  3.699  2.57  3.934  1.777  6.361 
  Observations  4533  2939  1594  3286  1247  2957  1576  1621  305 
Unemployment 23-33 Mean  2.19  1.569  3.333  1.934  2.862  1.783  2.952  1.318  4.875 
  Observations  4533  2939  1594  3286  1247  2957  1576  1621  305 
Unemployment 33-42 Mean  0.991  0.783  1.376  0.835  1.404  0.817  1.319  0.687  2.17 
  Observations  2939  2939  1594  3286  1247  2957  1576  1621  305 
Wage 23  Mean  2.409  2.409  x  2.432  2.334  2.44  2.341  2.448  x 
  Observations  3286  2939  x  2249  690  2007  932  1621  x 
Wage 33  Mean  5.379  5.835  4.389  5.379  x  5.468  5.164  5.884  x 
  Observations  3286  2249  1037  3286  x  2319  967  1621  x 
Wage 42  Mean  2957  8.331  6.793  8.041  7.093  7.837  x  8.458  x 
  Observations  7.837  2007  950  2319  638  2957  x  1621  x   43 
 
Appendix A.2 
Full regressions for Wages at Age 23, 33 and 42: Men 
  Wage at 23 
(Table 2a column 
III) 
Wage at 33 
(Table 3a 
column IV) 
Wage at 42 
(Table 4a column 
V) 
Variable     
Youth Unemployment     
1-2 Months  -0.016  -0.014  -0.029 
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
3-4 Months  -0.042  -0.070  -0.026 
  (0.025)*  (0.025)***  (0.033) 
5-6 Months  -0.105  -0.073  0.020 
  (0.031)**  (0.030)**  (0.042) 
7-12 Months  -0.100  -0.106  -0.070 
  (0.029)**  (0.026)***  (0.035)** 
13+ Months  -0.232  -0.133  -0.078 
  (0.034)**  (0.028)***  (0.039)** 
Education Dummy Variables     
Lower vocational qualifications  0.107  0.193  0.143 
  (0.063)*  (0.058)***  (0.083)* 
Lower academic (below O’level  0.023  0.082  0.087 
or equivalent)  (0.049)  (0.050)*  (0.069) 
Intermediate Vocational  0.080  0.110  0.028 
(equivalent to O’level)  (0.045)*  (0.050)**  (0.064) 
O’level or equivalent  0.091  0.151  0.156 
  (0.021)**  (0.021)***  (0.028)** 
Higher vocational  0.139  0.190  0.198 
(Akin to A’level)  (0.023)**  (0.023)***  (0.032)** 
A’level or equivalent  0.154  0.350  0.436 
  (0.034)**  (0.033)***  (0.044)** 
Level 5 vocational  0.161  0.333  0.287 
(equivalent to degree)  (0.028)**  (0.028)***  (0.038)** 
Degree or equivalent  0.105  0.450  0.486 
  (0.030)**  (0.029)***  (0.039)** 
Unemployment 23-33       
1-2 Months    -0.031  0.028 
    (0.036)  (0.049) 
3-4 Months    -0.185  -0.136 
    (0.041)***  (0.056)** 
5-6 Months    -0.192  -0.108 
    (0.048)***  (0.064)* 
7-12 Months    -0.158  -0.133 
    (0.036)***  (0.051)** 
13+ Months    -0.297  -0.145 
    (0.027)***  (0.040)** 
Unemployment 33-42       
1-2 Months      -0.052 
      (0.067) 
3-4 Months      -0.141 
      (0.060)** 
5-6 Months      -0.051 
      (0.066) 
7-12 Months      -0.218 
      (0.060)** 
13+ Months      -0.270 
      (0.053)**   44 
 
  Wage at 23 
(Table 2a 
column III) 
Wage at 33 
(Table 3a 
column IV) 
Wage at 42 
(Table 4a 
column V) 
Regional Dummy Variables       
Region 2   -0.055  0.038  0.049 
  (0.032)*  (0.034)  (0.047) 
Region 3   -0.115  0.003  -0.025 
  (0.033)**  (0.034)  (0.047) 
Region 4   -0.087  0.018  -0.006 
  (0.033)**  (0.034)  (0.047) 
Region 5   -0.044  0.016  -0.059 
  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.048) 
Region 6   -0.153  0.054  0.004 
  (0.044)**  (0.044)  (0.060) 
Region 7   -0.159  0.052  0.018 
  (0.036)**  (0.036)  (0.050) 
Region 8   -0.016  0.195  0.146 
  (0.028)  (0.030)***  (0.041)*** 
Region 9   -0.090  -0.044  -0.078 
  (0.038)**  (0.039)  (0.054) 
Region 10  -0.115  -0.003  -0.040 
  (0.034)**  (0.035)  (0.047) 
Region 11  -0.106  -0.001  0.097 
  (0.162)  (0.128)  (0.153) 
Family Effects     
Father stayed in FT edu > age 16  0.016  -0.032  -0.036 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
Mother staying in FT edu > age 16  0.026  -0.013  -0.032 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.027) 
Ethnic origin Non-white  0.053  0.048  0.031 
  (0.052)  (0.049)  (0.068) 
Ever had Education special needs  -0.208  -0.134  -0.131 
  (0.047)**  (0.043)***  (0.063)** 
Ever lived in financial deprivation  -0.014  0.013  -0.003 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
Ever lived in Local Authority Care  -0.000  0.040  0.116 
  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.052)** 
Family Total Income aged 16  -0.000  0.012  0.090 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.030)***   45 
 
  Wage at 23 
(Table 2a 
column III) 
Wage at 33 
(Table 3a 
column IV) 
Wage at 42 
(Table 4a 
column V) 
Individual Effects     
Negative anxiety traits aged 7, Score1  -0.015  0.006  0.002 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.025) 
Negative anxiety traits aged 7, Score2  -0.024  -0.008  -0.011 
  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.025) 
Negative anxiety traits aged 7, Score4  -0.015  -0.041  -0.015 
  (0.023)  (0.023)*  (0.031) 
Low School attendance (<75%)   0.059  -0.031  -0.001 
  (0.027)**  (0.027)  (0.038) 
Sick1  0.012  0.008  -0.022 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.024) 
Sick2  0.019  -0.026  -0.046 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.037) 
Probation by age 16  0.022  0.030  -0.020 
  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.040) 
Vocabulary, 2nd quintile score aged 11  0.012  0.056  0.077 
  (0.023)  (0.023)**  (0.031)** 
Vocabulary 3rd quintile score aged 11  0.000  0.045  0.077 
  (0.024)  (0.024)*  (0.033)** 
Vocabulary 4th quintile score aged 11  0.006  0.068  0.094 
  (0.026)  (0.026)***  (0.035)*** 
Vocabulary 5th quintile score aged 11  -0.013  0.075  0.060 
  (0.028)  (0.028)***  (0.038) 
Arithmetic 2nd quintile score aged 11  0.029  0.023  0.044 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.033) 
Arithmetic 3rd quintile score aged 11  0.036  0.039  0.052 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.033) 
Arithmetic 4th quintile aged 11  0.057  0.065  0.045 
  (0.025)**  (0.025)**  (0.034) 
Arithmetic 5th quintile score aged 11  0.100  0.096  0.067 
  (0.026)**  (0.027)***  (0.036)* 
IQ 2nd quintile score aged 11  -0.000  0.006  0.027 
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.031) 
IQ 3rd quintile score aged 11  -0.011  0.043  0.046 
  (0.024)  (0.024)*  (0.032) 
IQ 4th quintile score aged 11  0.009  0.052  0.042 
  (0.025)  (0.025)**  (0.034) 
IQ 5th quintile score aged 11  0.009  0.074  0.097 
  (0.027)  (0.026)***  (0.035)*** 
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Appendix Table A.3. 
The Full Wage Regressions at Age 23, 33 and 42: Women 
  Wage at 23 
(Table 2b 
column III) 
Wage at 33 
(Table 3b 
column IV) 
Wage at 42 
(Table 4b 
column V) 
Variable     
Youth Unemployment     
1-2 Months  -0.036  -0.023  -0.038 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
3-4 Months  -0.116  -0.081  -0.025 
  (0.027)**  (0.028)**  (0.031) 
5-6 Months  -0.127  -0.050  -0.011 
  (0.036)**  (0.037)  (0.040) 
7-12 Months  -0.125  -0.067  -0.059 
  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.033)* 
13+ Months  -0.192  -0.141  -0.101 
  (0.040)**  (0.033)**  (0.039)** 
Education Dummy Variables     
Lower vocational qualifications  -0.012  0.162  0.039 
  (0.052)  (0.056)**  (0.062) 
Lower academic (below O’level  -0.020  0.180  -0.050 
or equivalent)  (0.067)  (0.074)**  (0.087) 
Intermediate Vocational  -0.024  -0.144  0.014 
(equivalent to O’level)  (0.087)  (0.103)  (0.106) 
O’level or equivalent  0.063  0.129  0.133 
  (0.022)**  (0.022)**  (0.024)** 
Higher vocational  0.136  0.302  0.261 
(Akin to A’level)  (0.033)**  (0.037)**  (0.040)** 
A’level or equivalent  0.199  0.443  0.415 
  (0.037)**  (0.041)**  (0.043)** 
Level 5 vocational  0.261  0.538  0.515 
(equivalent to degree)  (0.029)**  (0.031)**  (0.033)** 
Degree or equivalent  0.308  0.648  0.638 
  (0.032)**  (0.034)**  (0.037)** 
Unemployment 23-33       
1-2 Months    0.037  0.032 
    (0.052)  (0.059) 
3-4 Months    -0.073  -0.005 
    (0.058)  (0.066) 
5-6 Months    0.002  -0.045 
    (0.067)  (0.077) 
7-12 Months    -0.098  -0.048 
    (0.045)**  (0.051) 
13+ Months    -0.186  -0.075 
    (0.038)**  (0.045)* 
Unemployment 33-42       
1-2 Months      -0.091 
      (0.083) 
3-4 Months      0.185 
      (0.076)** 
5-6 Months      -0.007 
      (0.073) 
7-12 Months      -0.133 
      (0.080)* 
13+ Months      -0.131 
      (0.071)*   47 
  Wage at 23 
(Table 2b 
column III) 
Wage at 33 
(Table 3b 
column IV)
Wage at 42 
(Table 4b 
column V) 
Regional Dummy Variables       
Region 2   0.025  0.117  -0.018 
  (0.037)  (0.040)**  (0.043) 
Region 3   0.021  0.007  -0.063 
  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.045) 
Region 4   0.029  0.098  -0.032 
  (0.039)  (0.041)**  (0.046) 
Region 5   0.003  0.036  -0.082 
  (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.049)* 
Region 6   0.057  0.106  -0.090 
  (0.049)  (0.051)*
* 
(0.056) 
Region 7   0.003  -0.014  -0.089 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.045)** 
Region 8   0.131  0.184  0.023 
  (0.034)**  (0.036)**  (0.039) 
Region 9   0.026  -0.026  -0.055 
  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.052) 
Region 10  0.010  0.064  -0.054 
  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.045) 
Region 11  -0.069  0.138  0.005 
  (0.177)  (0.104)  (0.105) 
Family Effects     
Father stayed in FT edu > age 16  0.023  -0.048  -0.066 
  (0.022)  (0.024)**  (0.027)** 
Mother staying in FT edu > age 16  0.025  -0.002  -0.020 
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.026) 
Ethnic origin Non-white  0.118  0.208  0.303 
  (0.066)*  (0.067)*
* 
(0.074)** 
Ever had Education special needs  -0.551  -0.192  -0.158 
  (0.089)**  (0.081)**  (0.104) 
Ever lived in financial deprivation  -0.001  -0.042  -0.029 
  (0.023)  (0.023)*  (0.026) 
Ever lived in Local Authority Care  -0.014  0.022  0.049 
  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.052) 
Family Total Income aged 16  0.011  0.017  -0.013 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.026) 
Individual Effects       
Negative anxiety traits aged 7, Score1  -0.018  -0.064  0.015 
  (0.019)  (0.021)**  (0.022) 
Negative anxiety traits aged 7, Score2  -0.059  -0.039  0.003 
  (0.023)**  (0.024)  (0.026) 
Negative anxiety traits aged 7, Score4  -0.037  -0.082  0.059 
  (0.032)  (0.034)**  (0.037) 
Low School attendance (<75%)   -0.077  0.004  0.002 
  (0.031)**  (0.030)  (0.034) 
Sick1  -0.030  -0.012  0.012 
  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
Sick2  -0.083  -0.052  -0.003 
  (0.028)**  (0.029)*  (0.033) 
Probation by age 16  -0.125  0.034  -0.045 
  (0.058)**  (0.051)  (0.058)   48 
 
  Wage at 23 
(Table 2b 
column III) 
Wage at 33 
(Table 3b 
column IV)
Wage at 42 
(Table 4b 
column V) 
Vocabulary, 2nd quintile score aged 11  0.119  0.043  0.033 
  (0.032)**  (0.033)  (0.036) 
Vocabulary 3rd quintile score aged 11  0.106  0.059  0.026 
  (0.032)**  (0.033)*  (0.036) 
Vocabulary 4th quintile score aged 11  0.125  0.059  0.062 
  (0.033)**  (0.033)*  (0.036)* 
Vocabulary 5th quintile score aged 11  0.130  0.112  0.059 
  (0.034)**  (0.035)**  (0.038) 
Arithmetic 2nd quintile score aged 11  -0.001  0.010  0.015 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
Arithmetic 3rd quintile score aged 11  -0.002  -0.039  0.009 
  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.031) 
Arithmetic 4th quintile aged 11  -0.021  -0.012  0.011 
  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.032) 
Arithmetic 5th quintile score aged 11  0.002  0.039  0.078 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.034)** 
IQ 2nd quintile score aged 11  0.024  0.036  0.071 
  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.031)** 
IQ 3rd quintile score aged 11  0.052  0.062  0.084 
  (0.028)*  (0.029)**  (0.032)** 
IQ 4th quintile score aged 11  0.081  0.071  0.028 
  (0.029)**  (0.031)**  (0.033) 
IQ 5th quintile score aged 11  0.111  0.068  0.054 
  (0.030)**  (0.032)**  (0.035) 
 
 
 